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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. At the request of the government of the Republic of Korea,
1
 the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) agreed to conduct a Special Review of Korea‟s international 
development co-operation. The review‟s main objective is to contribute good practice and lessons 
learned to the Korean authorities‟ internal dialogue on the reform of their development assistance. 
Korea aims to become a member of the DAC in 2010, and although this review is not a formal part of 
that process, it should contribute to Korea‟s progression as a donor with DAC membership in mind. 
The review should also provide interesting insights for the ongoing discussions between DAC and 
non-DAC members on development co-operation.  
2. On the basis of agreed terms of reference for the Special Review, a DAC Peer Review Team 
composed of examiners from Australia and Canada and three staff members from the OECD 
Development Co-operation Directorate visited Seoul from 3 to 6 March 2008. The team consulted 
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT), the Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance (MOSF), the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA), and the Korea Eximbank‟s 
Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF). The team also met with representatives of 
selected non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and development co-operation academics. This 
report outlines the team‟s findings and observations on Korean international development co-operation 
from those consultations. 
3. The report is organised around five major sections. Section 1 describes the context of Korean 
development co-operation with a focus on history, legal framework, aid architecture and public 
awareness. Section 2 examines aid volume, channels and allocations. Section 3 covers organisation 
and management. Section 4 considers aid effectiveness while section 5 deals with humanitarian action. 
Each section ends with suggested actions for the Korean Government to consider as it expands and 
improves its development assistance programmes.  
The framework and architecture of Korea’s development co-operation  
4. Korea is keen to develop its position as a donor and has recent development knowledge and 
experience to share with others. Currently, it has no overall legislation to govern its development co-
operation. It could consider introducing such legislation which should clearly set out Korea‟s overall 
ODA objectives and provide the legal basis for a consolidated aid system.  
5. The Korean aid architecture is based on two main pillars. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (MOFAT) is responsible for Korea‟s grant aid policy which is implemented by the Korea 
International Co-operation Agency (KOICA). The Ministry of Strategy and Finance determines 
concessional loan policy, which is implemented by the Korea Eximbank‟s Economic Development 
and Co-operation Fund (EDCF). In addition, a further 30 other ministries, agencies and municipalities 
are involved in providing small amounts of grant aid, mainly in the form of technical co-operation.  
                                                     
1 The Republic of Korea is hereafter referred to as „Korea‟ in this report. 
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6. The government could consider tackling this two pillar system and creating a single entity 
with sole authority over development co-operation objectives, policy and strategy. This organisation 
could develop a unified policy framework, which leads and applies to all parts of the ODA system. 
ODA volumes, channels and allocations  
7. Korea‟s ODA has been increasing slowly but steadily since the start of the decade, and in 
2007 it amounted to USD 673 million (net disbursements), representing 0.07% of GNI. The previous 
government announced ODA/GNI targets of 0.118% by 2010 and 0.25 % by 2015, but the plan is 
being reviewed under the new administration. Any targets should be formally and firmly committed to 
by the government as a whole. Korea also faces a special situation: the support that it gives to the 
northern part of the peninsula. This assistance is estimated by Korea to be USD 558 million in 2007 
but since it is not formally reported to the DAC, it is not officially verified or recorded as ODA.  
8. A feature of the Korean development system is the large use of concessional loans, partly 
explained by Korea‟s own positive experience as a recipient of loans, and the profoundly held belief 
that this instrument imposes essential fiscal discipline on the recipient country. Loans are a valid tool 
for development in the right circumstances, but Korea should take note of the global efforts to reduce 
debt and ensure debt sustainability, especially in least developed countries (LDCs). Hence, it is of 
concern that the grant element of bilateral ODA commitments to LDCs in Korea‟s aid portfolio is 
below the percentage required in the DAC Recommendations on Terms and Conditions of Aid – all 
DAC members are expected to meet this recommendation. 
Organisation and management  
9. The Korean development co-operation system is fragmented, with four main actors 
(MOFAT, MOSF, KOICA and EDCF) and around 30 other ministries, agencies and municipalities 
implementing separate assistance operations for each partner country, and this lack of co-ordination 
creates inefficiencies. 
10. Positive steps have been taken to address these problems, notably with the introduction of 
the mid-term Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) for the priority countries. They set out Korea‟s 
strategy and planned activities, but at present KOICA and EDCF each produce a separate CAS for a 
given country. It would be better, however, if there were a unified CAS for each country. There is a 
master-plan Integrated Country Assistance Strategy 2008-10 which outlines Korean aims in all 
priority countries, but this appears to be a compilation of separate Korean interventions, and could be 
improved by being a collectively designed strategic action plan. A lack of unified strategies, 
particularly at the country level, undermines the coherence, efficiency and potential impact of 
development activities. 
Increasing the effectiveness of aid 
11. Korea is committed to increasing the effectiveness of its aid and has taken the positive step 
of signing the Paris Declaration and taking part in the monitoring survey in 2006 – the only non-DAC 
country to do so. Korea has taken some steps to align its aid with partner countries‟ national systems, 
and is advised to continue to make progress on this. It is also encouraged to co-ordinate and harmonise 
with other donors. Korea may wish to consider the use of joint projects and delegated co-operation, 
especially with donors in areas where Korea does not have experience or presence. 
12. Korea is aware that it needs to untie its aid. An estimated 98% of Korean bilateral aid is 
either tied or partially tied – an extremely high proportion, and at odds with a key DAC 
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recommendation. Korea has introduced a Roadmap on Untying which is a positive start, but significant 
progress is required, and the government should be mindful that it must fully comply with the DAC 
recommendation on untying within a reasonable timeframe of acceding to the DAC. 
Humanitarian Action   
13. Korea has expanded its humanitarian aid efforts in recent years, and in 2006 allocated USD 
23 million, or 5% of its gross bilateral ODA to humanitarian activities. Korea‟s main bilateral 
interventions are in large-scale natural disasters, to which it responds by sending goods and funds, as 
well as professional relief workers and volunteers. It also has begun to work through multilateral 
channels, funding the humanitarian UN agencies directly, and contributing to UN Inter-Agency 
Consolidated Appeals and the Central Emergency Response Fund. 
14. In 2007 Korea undertook a number of reforms to improve its humanitarian system, including 
the introduction of an Overseas Emergency Relief Act, the creation of a Humanitarian Aid Division 
within MOFAT and the development of an emergency relief operational manual. It is also planning to 
introduce a policy on humanitarian aid – which it is lacking at present. This policy should contain an 
explicit commitment to the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles and good practice, including the 
core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. Korea should ensure that its 
humanitarian activities are needs-based, not driven by donor visibility objectives, and are delivered 
within the framework of a co-ordinated international response.  
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DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 
1. Context for Korean Development Co-operation 
1.1 History and context 
1. Korea is one of the most successful economic transformation stories of the twentieth century. 
From 1945 to the present, rapid growth has propelled Korea to its current position as the thirteenth 
largest economy in the world. Part of its success was due to its effective use of official development 
assistance (ODA) – the government estimates that it received USD 12.7 billion in the post-war period 
which helped spur economic development and decrease poverty. Now Korea has successfully moved 
from being an aid recipient to becoming an aid donor.  
2. Korea is eager to play a role in the international donor community that is commensurate with 
its economic size. It joined the OECD in 1996 and the Special Review is one more step to fully 
integrate it into the development community, conducted with a view to Korea attaining Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) membership in 2010. Korea is keen to develop its position as a donor. It 
has firsthand experience of being an aid recipient, knows the importance and value of the effective use 
of aid, and has recent knowledge and experience to share with others who are in the process of 
development.  
1.2 The legal framework  
3. Korea is a new and emerging donor, and understandably is facing a number of key 
challenges. As yet, its development assistance has no over-arching legal basis which has contributed to 
a lack of over-arching policy or strategy. 
4. This gap in overall direction is due to the short history and bottom-up development of the aid 
system so far. Korea began its aid activities in the 1970s and 1980s with the provision of technical 
training, and only in the late 1980s and early 1990s made a more concerted effort to broaden and 
increase its ODA. In 1987 the Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF) was founded 
to provide concessional loans to developing countries, and in 1991 the Korea International 
Co-operation Agency (KOICA) was created to implement grants (section 1.3 and Figure 1 for more 
information on the Korean aid architecture). These organisations were established by two separate 
Acts, both of which define the goals of Korea‟s bilateral ODA as: firstly the promotion of „mutually 
co-operative relationships‟; and secondly, the „economic and social development‟ of developing 
countries.
2
 The clearly defined objective of mutual benefit to both the donor and to the recipient 
country is important in understanding Korea‟s thinking, and to some extent drives policy choices such 
as the heavy use of loans and tied aid (sections 2.2 and 4.3). 
5. Along with the laws founding EDCF and KOICA, there are also a number of other separate 
pieces of legislation such as a recent Act on overseas emergency relief. However, there is no over-
                                                     
2  From An Evaluation of Korea‟s 20-Year ODA – Kye Woo LEE, Gi Hoon Park. Korean Development 
Review Volume 29, No 2. 
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arching legal framework for development co-operation. This question has been raised in the National 
Assembly and four competing drafts of legislation were proposed in the previous National Assembly 
session, although all of them were automatically abandoned as the session was closed without 
reaching any agreement. This illustrates the challenge in arriving at an agreed and unified vision of the 
future Korean aid system. Korea could consider introducing ODA legislation which should set out a 
coherent and integrated development system, with clear aims and objectives based on agreed 
international commitments including poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), from which clear integrated strategies and policies can flow.   
1.3 Korea’s aid architecture  
6. The Korean aid architecture is based on two main pillars, but also includes a number of other 
much smaller actors. Just as there is no over-arching development assistance legislation, there is also 
no over-arching development assistance policy or strategy. MOFAT is responsible for roughly half of 
all bilateral ODA through grants implemented by its executing agency, KOICA. MOSF
3
 is responsible 
for roughly the other half, overseeing the loans implemented through the Korea Eximbank‟s EDCF. 
Multilateral aid is also split, with MOFAT responsible for the UN agencies and MOSF responsible for 
the international development banks. Furthermore, as many as 30 other ministries, agencies and 
municipalities execute some small development assistance projects and programmes using their own 
budget lines and that are generally detached from MOFAT and MOSF.  
Figure 1. Korea's ODA system 
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7. The Korean system functions as two pillars, and although MOFAT/KOICA and 
MOSF/EDCF consult, they do not fully co-ordinate. They follow separate policies and strategies in the 
same partner countries. There has been some effort to bring strategy together, notably with the creation 
in 2006 of the Committee for International Development Co-operation (CIDC), a Prime Minister led 
body comprising Ministers and civil society representatives, with „a mandate to deliberate the key 
                                                     
3 A combination of the previously entitled Ministry of Finance and Economy and the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget, as of February 2008. 
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policies and plans of Korea’s development Assistance’.4 The CIDC has approved planning tools such 
as the Comprehensive ODA Improvement Plan, the Mid-term ODA Strategy 2008-2010, the Annual 
Operation Plan and the Integrated Mid-term CAS Strategy 2008-2010. These instruments are a good 
first effort to introduce longer-term planning and to co-ordinate better across the Ministries. However, 
they appear to be an assembly of separate plans from the two pillars and could be improved by being 
genuinely integrated strategic plans. With the recent change of government, the CIDC is being 
reviewed. Any successor organisation should be tasked with promoting a cohesive and integrated 
approach to setting Korea‟s development assistance strategy. 
8. Korea could benefit from consolidating the number of organisations involved in 
development assistance. It would profit from having a single entity that has sole authority over 
development co-operation policy, that co-ordinates and ensures a whole-of-government development 
policy, and that is overall accountable for Korea‟s policy and programmes. This body should have 
overall responsibility for ensuring the aid policy is implemented, but implementation could be carried 
out by a separate agency, and a number of different actors could contribute. This is not to imply that 
one body alone should determine policy or implement all aid, but rather that all aid policies and 
activities should be co-ordinated and overseen by a single body to ensure that they fit into a coherent 
whole.      
1.4 Building-up public awareness  
9. The government is determined that Korea should increase its international activities and 
standing, and play a role on the global stage in keeping with its size. But for many Koreans this 
outlook is relatively new, as is the subject of development assistance. 
10. It is commendable that a number of public awareness surveys have been carried out. In 2005, 
in a survey by Gyunggi University on behalf of MOSF
5
, 44% of people said they were „somewhat 
aware of ODA‟ while 46% said they had „heard but were not fully aware of ODA‟. 18% of people 
surveyed were strongly in favour of increasing ODA levels, 35% supported a moderate increase, 28% 
thought the current level was appropriate and 13% wanted a decrease in ODA. In a more recent, 2007 
survey, by Gallup on behalf of MOFAT,
6
 56% of people surveyed supported the broad statement 
„considering Korea‟s national power and international prestige, do you think the Korean government 
should increase its efforts to help maintain world peace or to provide development aid for poor 
countries?‟. Another 28% of people thought the current level of effort was sufficient and 15% wanted 
to reduce Korea‟s contribution in these areas. The public awareness figures suggest that Korea has 
established some broad awareness and support for ODA, but unsurprisingly considering Korea‟s 
relatively recent movement from being a recipient to being a donor, there is continued work to be done. 
11. Increasing public awareness is one of KOICA‟s seven main objectives in its 2006 Annual 
Report. MOFAT and KOICA have undertaken various public awareness activities such as setting up a 
website, publishing a quarterly magazine entitled „International Development Co-operation‟, and 
holding an „ODA International Development Conference‟ that attracted an estimated 1 000 people 
during the day-long event. The government needs to continue to work to convince the public that 
Korea should engage further in the fight against global poverty, to enable it to make the hard choices 
between domestic and overseas spending and to scale up its ODA. At present there is no action plan 
                                                     
4 Korea memorandum to the DAC special review 2008, p 4. 
5 Public survey by MOFE (now MOSF) and Gyunggi University. 26 October 2005.  
6 Public survey on foreign policy by the MOFAT. 24 and 26 December 2007.    
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for public awareness, and Korea could build upon its commendable, but ad hoc, initiatives and 
develop a more strategic approach through such a plan.    
12. Korean civil society organisations in the field of development assistance are active and 
highly knowledgeable. The sector is well co-ordinated and growing, and the government, which 
already has a generally open and frank relationship with civil society, would benefit from continued 
engagement on policy dialogue with this sector. 
1.5  Recommendations 
 Korea could benefit from introducing overall legislation to govern its ODA. Any such 
legislation should clearly set out Korea‟s overall ODA objectives and should provide the 
legal basis for a consolidated aid system.  
 The government could consider creating a single entity with sole authority over development 
co-operation objectives, policy and strategy. This entity could develop a unified policy 
framework, which leads and applies to all parts of the ODA system.   
 While the introduction of the Comprehensive ODA Plan and the Mid-Term Strategy is a 
good beginning, they need to become integrated frameworks rather than compilations of 
individual strategies. Without such reform, the current structure could constrain efforts to 
manage increasing ODA. 
 Korea would benefit from a formal whole-of-government agreed public awareness strategy. 
It should be multi-year with key messages, targeted to specific audiences, and produced in 
partnership with civil society organisations. Also, it is understandable for emerging donors to 
need visibility to gain public support for their development co-operation efforts. But in the 
longer term, Korea will want to look at its visibility practice in the light of the Paris 
Declaration and other donors‟ behaviour where „flying the flag‟ through individual projects 
is being replaced by taking a share of the credit for the results achieved from collective 
interventions. 
 The government could further engage in dialogue with civil society organisations and draw 
upon their knowledge and expertise to inform development policy and practice.    
2. ODA volume, channels and allocations 
2.1 Increasing aid - a big challenge 
13. In 2007, Korea‟s net ODA amounted to USD 673 million, representing 0.07% of its GNI. As 
shown in Figure 2 below, Korea‟s aid has been increasing steadily since the start of the decade 
(excluding an unusually high figure of USD 752 million (0.10% ODA/GNI) in 2005 due to 
exceptional assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan, and IDA and large Inter-American Development Bank 
subscriptions). Understandably, as an emerging donor, Korea‟s ODA volume remains low in 
comparison to the DAC average ODA/GNI ratio of 0.31% (with the lowest ODA/GNI ratio for a DAC 
member of 0.17%). 
14. The government is determined to increase Korea‟s development assistance, and outlines this 
objective as one of 50 core tasks in its long-term planning manifesto, Vision 2030. The government set 
explicit targets, and committed to reaching 0.118% ODA/GNI by 2010 and 0.25% by 2015 (an 
estimated USD 3 billion+). In absolute terms, this is a huge challenge representing an increase in aid 
DAC SPECIAL REVIEW OF KOREA 
 
 13 
six-fold in just seven years, and a particularly sharp and exponential increase from 2012 to 2015. 
Furthermore, there is a difference of opinion within government as to the robustness of these targets, 
with some Ministries viewing them as indicative only rather than firm commitments. Now, the new 
administration is reviewing Vision 2030 including the ODA scaling-up plan. 
Figure 2. Korea's net ODA 
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15. Scaling up ODA can be difficult and there are no simple solutions. All donors are facing the 
same issue, and ultimately increasing ODA requires making hard political choices concerning 
increasing revenues and/or shifting spending from other areas. The Korean airline levy tax – i.e. every 
passenger leaving Korea must pay KRW 1 000 which is used for development purposes – is an 
innovative idea. There are few other innovative examples except for France allowing its municipalities 
to use 1% of the revenue they make from water and sanitation charges to be used for development 
assistance through decentralised co-operation (e.g. twinning arrangements).  
16. Countries that have been most successful at scaling up ODA have been helped by: setting 
strong targets and commitments (e.g. the EU member states have made commitments and would lose 
considerable political face if they do not achieve these), having top–level and government wide 
support, and increasing public support through successful public awareness policies.  
17. As a relatively new donor, Korea should set realistic, yet challenging targets. Once set, these 
targets should have whole-of-government support and be viewed as robust commitments, firmly 
incorporated in the government‟s budget planning.   
18. Korea faces a special situation – its support to the northern part of the peninsula – that does 
not apply to other donors. This assistance is not formally reported to the DAC, and therefore cannot be 
officially recorded as ODA. Korea estimates that the share of assistance to the North that could be 
counted as ODA was USD 558 million in 2007
7
. Although it is not counted as ODA, due to the special 
circumstances,  the sizeable nature of the assistance is a sum that should be noted.
8
  
                                                     
7
  In a letter dated 17 July 2008 Korea informed the DAC Chair that the USD 558 million delivered to 
North Korea consisted of: project aid (USD 123 million), technical co-operation (USD 5 million), 
developmental food aid (USD 131 million), humanitarian aid (USD 70 million), administrative costs 
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2.2 More bilateral aid and more grants  
19. In 2006, Korean development assistance consisted of 83% bilateral aid and 17% multilateral 
aid. This was the highest ever proportion of bilateral aid, with multilateral aid decreasing from its 22-
38% levels of the previous five to six years. In absolute terms, with the exception of 2005 when large 
multilateral development bank subscriptions were made, it appears that multilateral aid remains flat 
and bilateral aid is increasing.  
20. A particularity of the Korean system is the large use of concessional loans. In 2006 loans 
constituted 31% of ODA and grants 69%, a high figure compared to most other DAC donors. Nearly 
all DAC donors‟ aid portfolios consist almost entirely of grants, with only three DAC donors using 
loans to any real extent. Of these three, two have a loan component of around 10% of their aid 
portfolios, and only one uses loans to any significant degree. Korea‟s enthusiasm for loans can partly 
be explained by its own positive experience as a recipient of aid loans during its development process, 
and the profoundly held belief that this instrument imposes essential fiscal discipline on the recipient 
country.  
21. Undoubtedly, loans continue to be a valid tool for development in the right circumstances, 
but Korea should take note of the global efforts to reduce debt and ensure debt sustainability – a pre-
condition for development. It is of concern to see that in 2006, loans made up 60% of Korean bilateral 
aid to least developed countries (LDCs) and grants 40%, whereas the figure for lower middle income 
countries (LMICs) is 26% loans and 74% grants, and upper middle income countries (UMICs) receive 
only grants. Generally, due to debt sustainability issues, the opposite would be expected, with loans 
used more in MICs and less in LDCs.  
22. The DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid states that official development 
assistance to LDCs “should essentially be in the form of grants, and as a minimum, the average grant 
element of all commitments from a given donor should either be at least 86% to each Least Developed 
Country over a period of three years, or at least 90% annually” as a group.  All DAC members have 
accepted the Recommendation and all currently comply with this provision. Korea‟s present aid 
programme would not meet either of the alternative tests under the provision, so it is likely that DAC 
members would wish to know how Korea might address this.
9
 Loans have the further drawback that 
repayments may eventually offset ODA increases in net ODA. Therefore a heavy reliance on loans 
requires robust planning to ensure that repayments are fully taken into account in ODA scaling-up 
strategies.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
(USD 2 million), and loans by the government (USD 227 million). This information will be included 
in the annual Development Co-operation Report and elsewhere, as appropriate.      
8  However, as assistance to the North is not formally reported, it is not verified by the DAC in terms of 
being ODA eligible, measurable and evaluated in terms of development effectiveness.   
9 The Recommendation also states that “Members should endeavour fully to maintain or achieve as 
soon as possible an average grant element in their ODA commitments of at least 86 per cent” and that 
“Countries whose ODA commitments as a percentage of GNP [GNI] are significantly below the DAC 
average will not be considered as having met this terms target”.  Korea‟s average grant element for 
2005-6 was 89%, so its current programme already meets the first part of this overall terms 
target.  However, Korea‟s ODA as a percentage of GNI is significantly below the 2006 DAC average 
of 0.32%, meaning that it would not meet the second part of the target.   Three existing DAC members 
- Greece, Italy and the United States – also did not meet the second part of this target in 2006, though 
not by as wide a margin as Korea.  Korea‟s position and intentions with regard to this terms target 
would also be of interest to DAC members. 
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23. There is debate within the Korean government about the merits and appropriateness of loans, 
but mixed messages emanate from different parts of the system. In its 2006 Annual Report, KOICA 
states that the government is planning to increase the amount of grant aid,
10
 both in relative and 
absolute terms, but this is a view not necessarily agreed and accepted by all parts of the Korean 
government. The ongoing dispute over the ratio of loans and grants in Korea's aid portfolio is partly a 
consequence of the two pillar system, and could distract from constructing a single vision for Korea‟s 
development co-operation.  
2.3 Increasing the focus on LDCs and other low income countries 
24. Data show that Korean bilateral aid to LDCs and other low income countries was 42% in 
2006, compared to a DAC average of 56% (Table 1). Korea may want to look at how to increase this 
figure, but also to ensure that it applies suitable policies and instruments in LDCs and other low-
income countries. As noted above, loans are generally less appropriate in these countries, where debt 
sustainability is an issue. Overall, Korea should be mindful that its development co-operation 
maintains a focus on poverty reduction and contributes to the MDGs, by prioritising LDCs and low-
income countries and using appropriate aid instruments. 
Table 1. Bilateral ODA by region and income groups 
 
                                                     
10 KOICA 2006 Annual Report, President‟s message. Page 5. 
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2.4 Maintaining a credible level of bilateral ODA to priority countries   
25. In 2006, Korea disbursed 49% of its bilateral aid to Asia, 20% to the Middle-East, 14% to 
Africa, 9% to Europe and 7% to the Americas (Table 1). Asia is expected to remain the largest 
recipient of Korean aid, but Korea also committed to increasing aid to Africa three-fold by 2008 under 
its Initiative for Africa Development announced in March 2006.  
26. The Asia focus is logical considering Korea‟s geographical position and development 
experience. The intention to increase activities in Africa is understandable, but in an era when the 
division of labour and increased co-ordination are paramount, it would be prudent for Korea to 
consider carefully how and where it expands in Africa. Spreading itself too thinly across too many 
countries, initiating small, stand alone activities would likely result in little developmental impact. 
Korea might also like to consider how involvement in Latin America fits with its general aid 
objectives. 
27. There is some lack of clarity in how to identify partner countries and objectives. The laws 
establishing KOICA and EDCF do not offer objectives for ODA in operational terms, and MOFAT 
and MOSF do not have operational guidelines on the criteria for allocating ODA. Also there is no 
overall national development policy strategy nor policy papers declaring objectives or principles in 
operational terms. It would be helpful if the criteria for selecting partner countries were transparent, 
understood and applied across the board. There is also confusion amongst MOFAT and MOSF 
regarding the total number of partner countries (see below). There should be a single list of partner 
countries for Korean aid determined by the overall policy. 
28. Nevertheless, Korea is taking the positive step of concentrating and focusing its aid 
geographically. It has pledged to reduce its number of partner countries from 127 to 58, and within 
this smaller number, to focus on „priority‟ partner countries. MOFAT/KOICA have identified 19 
priority countries to receive grant aid, and separately MOSF/EDCF have identified 11 priority 
countries to receive loans. Since 7 of these are in common, there is a total of 23 priority partners 
(Table 2 below). 
29. MOFAT and MOSF have each introduced separate mid-term Country Assistance Strategies 
(CAS) (section 3.1 for more detail) for these 23 priority countries
11
 which run from 2008-10, and are a 
good start to providing a guideline for programme/project design and a standard for evaluation. 
Table 2. Priority partner countries 
Region 
(total 23) 
MOFAT/KOICA priority 
partners (19 countries)  
MOSF/EDCF priority 
partners (11 countries) 
Asia (9 countries)  
 
Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Cambodia, Sri 
Lanka, Bangladesh, Mongolia   
Vietnam, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Cambodia  
Africa (6 countries) 
 
Egypt, Tanzania, Senegal, 
Ethiopia, Nigeria 
Angola 
Central and South 
America (4 countries)  
Guatemala, Peru, Paraguay Guatemala, Colombia 
Middle East (2 countries) Iraq Yemen 
Central Asia, Europe and 
CIS (2 countries) 
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan  
  Note: Countries in bold receive both KOICA and EDCF assistance. 
                                                     
11  For each of the seven partner countries where MOFAT/KOICA and MOSF/EDCF are both active 
there are two separate Country Assistance Strategies.   
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30. In 2005-6, Korea disbursed 67% of its gross bilateral aid to its top 10 recipient countries, 
which is above the DAC average of 62%. Korea‟s top aid beneficiaries are Iraq, which receives 25% 
of all Korean bilateral aid, followed by Sri Lanka and Bangladesh with 7% each.   
2.5 Ensuring a focus on a limited number of sectors 
31. Other donors are making significant efforts to focus on fewer sectors partly as a result of 
efforts to increase the „division of labour‟ amongst themselves and to make aid more effective. Korea 
asserts that it is increasing the sector concentration of aid, and in the Mid-Term ODA Strategy commits 
to focusing on seven sectors: education, health, governance, rural development, information and 
communication technology, industry and energy, and environment and gender. The awareness of the 
need to concentrate is positive but the sectors as defined are quite broad. This permits Korea to engage 
in a wide spectrum of activities in any given country. Korea could seek to determine its comparative 
advantages and focus in real terms, limiting itself where possible to two or three sectors in each 
partner country and in co-ordination with other donors.  
2.6 Multilateral aid and other aid modalities  
32. In 2006, Korea disbursed 17% of its aid through multilateral channels, below the DAC 
average of 26%, and running at a relatively flat level through the first  half of the decade (aside from a 
spike in 2005 due to exceptional subscriptions). However, Korea envisages significant absolute 
increases from USD 79 million in 2006 to USD 210 million in 2007 and USD 334 million in 2008. 
With sizeable scaling up plans on the longer-term horizon, it can be expected that Korea will continue 
to expand the use of multilateral organisations – often a good conduit for managing rapid aid increases. 
Roughly half of Korea‟s multilateral aid goes through multilateral development banks and just under 
half through United Nations organisations (60% of this to seven UN agencies, with the World Health 
Organisation, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and United Nations Development Programme 
foremost beneficiaries). In efforts to increase effective engagement with the multilaterals, Korea will 
be an observer in the Multilateral Organisations Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) from 
2008.    
33. The responsibility for managing much of the multilateral aid portfolio is split between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. MOFAT is in charge 
of contributions to international organisations such as the UN, while MOSF is responsible for 
subscriptions and contributions to multilateral development banks. But in total, over 20 ministries are 
making contributions or subscriptions to an estimated 80 international organisations. Korea is 
currently introducing a guideline for co-operation with multilateral institutions, and would benefit 
from developing a coherent over-arching strategy for interaction with multilaterals. Although amongst 
other donors, it is not unusual for the responsibility for multilateral aid to be split, the spread of 
funding across more than 20 different ministries is exceptional and could be addressed. 
34. Channelling aid through multilaterals is one way to efficiently manage a rapid increase of aid; 
however, Korea may also want to explore the use of other, innovative aid modalities. At present, 
budget support is rarely used, but Korea is tentatively considering engaging in Sector Wide 
Approaches (SWAps), and in the future may also want to consider the use of general budget support. 
It may also want to consider further pooled funding, (it already does some, a good example being the 
Central Emergency Response Fund, section 5.1) and other effective mechanisms such as partnerships 
with other donors through delegated co-operation (section 4). 
DAC SPECIAL REVIEW OF KOREA 
 
 18 
2.7 Cross-cutting issues 
35. Korea recognises that it puts limited emphasis on cross-cutting issues, and has pledged to 
address this. There is a focus sector entitled „environment and gender‟ but according to Korean figures, 
only 2.5 % of ODA goes towards projects with an environmental content, while gender receives 
insignificant funding. As it builds a more sophisticated aid programme, Korea will want to give more 
attention to these, and other important cross-cutting issues, such as human rights and governance. It 
will also want to consider how to mainstream them throughout Korean programmes and projects.  
2.8 Private sector 
36. Korea has a strong interest in involving the private sector in its development co-operation 
activities. The following gives some experiences of other donors which Korea could consider in 
developing its approach to working in this area. As the major contributor to growth and the creation of 
more and better jobs, development of private sector activity in developing countries is central to 
donors‟ efforts to substantially and sustainably reduce poverty. For many years, donors approached 
development of the private sector by supporting specific types of firms considered important for the 
poor (e.g. certain sizes or sectors), sometimes through firm-to-firm linkages with enterprises in their 
own country. Experience has shown shortcomings in the use of such concessional finance to end users 
in the private sector, which typically create market distortions and may often be unsustainable, once 
the subsidy stops. Thus, the focus has often been on firms, rather than market outcomes, and there has 
been insufficient recognition of how policies need to reflect better the interests of all parts of society, 
notably those of the poor who often have little voice and are excluded from decision-making processes. 
37. The market-based approach that many donors (e.g. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) are now pursuing puts the focus on improving the supply-side 
response to new or expanding opportunities in both the formal and informal economies, especially in 
sectors where poor men and women are economically active and regions where the poor live. 
Interventions aim to address the specific, local constraints encountered by, for example, expanding 
access to financial services or productive resources such as land and technical knowledge. ODA can 
also be used to improve the environment for private sector activity by, for example, supporting 
required policy and institutional reforms or helping to expand access to affordable and maintained 
infrastructure.    
2.9 Recommendations 
 The commitment made at the highest level to increasing development assistance – by the 
President in his inaugural speech – is positive, as are the targets in the government‟s Vision 
2030 to scale-up to 0.118% ODA/GNI by 2011 and 0.25% by 2015. It would be useful to 
have these targets widely publicised and formally committed to. Delivering on these targets 
will improve aid predictability for Korea and its partners. 
 All DAC members comply with the DAC Recommendation on Terms and Conditions of Aid, 
which sets a minimum average grant level that donors‟ portfolios to LDCs should contain. In 
time, Korea will want to be clear how it plans to meet this recommendation.    
 There is a need for Korea to integrate grants and concessional loans to support one clear 
strategy overall and at the country level; the use of instruments should be driven by 
objectives and expected development outcomes.  
 The increasing geographic focus of Korea‟s aid is welcome. As Korea scales up it should 
stay focused, and be aware that 59 partner countries/23 priority countries remains relatively 
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high compared to DAC members with similar levels of ODA. It should create a single list of 
partner countries consistent with overall policy and objectives.  
 Korea could develop an over-arching strategy for all multilateral aid, spanning the MDBs, 
UN and other international organisations, assessing the contribution that each organisation 
can make to Korea‟s development objectives. It should be driven by, and fit within, the 
overall aid strategy, and it should complement and reinforce bilateral aid. Further, it would 
be advisable to reduce significantly the number of organisations (80) that are funded. 
3. Organisation and management of Korean development co-operation 
3.1 The four main actors (MOFAT, KOICA, MOSF and EDCF)  
38. The Korean development co-operation system comprises four main actors. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) is responsible for Korea‟s bilateral grant aid policy, which is 
implemented by the Korea International Co-operation Agency (KOICA).  The Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance (MOSF) is responsible for concessional loan policy, which is implemented by the Korea 
Eximbank‟s Economic Development and Co-operation Fund (EDCF). Both MOFAT and MOSF have 
shared responsibility for part of Korea‟s multilateral aid (Figure 1 for a reminder of the aid 
architecture).  
39. MOFAT formulates short-term and long-term bilateral grant aid strategies and is the main 
channel for co-operation with the OECD/DAC. In August 2007, MOFAT‟s bilateral aid activities were 
unified under a single, newly created Bureau for Development Co-operation, comprising the 
Development Policy Division, the Development Co-operation Division and the Humanitarian 
Assistance Division. This prudent effort to consolidate within the Ministry is beginning to add value, 
not least in the Bureau‟s growing awareness of and ability to take an overall perspective on the 
systemic challenges facing Korean development co-operation.  
40. KOICA is under the supervision of MOFAT and administers the Korean government‟s grant 
aid and technical co-operation programmes. KOICA collects information and identifies projects, often 
submitted by the partner country. It reviews them based on partners national poverty reduction plans, 
Korean comparative advantage, and their compatibility with Korea‟s Mid-term ODA Strategy and the 
Korean Country Assistance Strategy for that country. KOICA is involved in feasibility studies, 
engaging in policy dialogue, concluding agreements with partner countries, and designing and 
implementing projects directly, or through outsourcing, as well as through dispatching experts and 
oversees volunteers.  
41. KOICA‟s headquarters office comprises three policy related offices and seven operational 
divisions (organigramme in Annex A). KOICA also has 22 representation offices in 21 partner 
countries to implement at the field level. 
42. MOSF establishes the annual budget and national fiscal management plan to support public 
expenditure for national development activities. It is also responsible, through the Development 
Co-operation Division, for formulating policy for the concessional loan part of Korean ODA, and for 
managing and supervising the Korea Eximbank‟s execution of the EDCF. It provides a small amount 
of grant aid to conduct feasibility studies prior to the implementation of EDCF assistance. Furthermore, 
the MOSF‟s International Financial Institutions Division is in charge of Korea‟s communication, 
policies, contributions and subscriptions to the Multilateral Development Banks.     
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43. The Korea Eximbank operates and administers the EDCF, which is the concessional loan 
arm of the Korean development co-operation system. The EDCF principally offers development 
project loans and equipment loans to partner countries which are determined by MOSF though the 
deliberations of its management board, the Fund Management Council (Annex A for an organigramme 
of the operating system of the EDCF). The EDCF appraises the feasibility of projects and loan 
applications, and after the MOSF has then determined the amount, terms and conditions of the loans, 
the EDCF enters into the loan agreement with the partner country.     
44. As well as the four principal actors above, a further estimated 30 other ministries, agencies 
and municipalities, are involved in providing grant aid, mainly in the form of technical co-operation 
(i.e. the dispatch of experts and inviting people from developing countries to train in Korea). 
3.2 The importance of good co-ordination and co-operation between all ministries and 
agencies     
45. With four main actors and a further estimated 30 other ministries, agencies and 
municipalities with separate aid portfolios, the Korean system is fragmented. Different organisations 
design and implement separate assistance operations in each partner country, and there is a lack of co-
ordination and therefore some inefficiency. A fragmented approach also increases demands on over-
stretched partner governments.  
46. Korea has taken positive steps to introduce strategic thinking, notably with the introduction 
of the mid-term Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) for the priority countries. The CASs run from 
2008 to 2010, and will be updated and modified. They include an overview of the political, economic 
and social situation in a given country, and an assessment of the partner government‟s development 
plans. They also include a summary of other donors‟ activities in the country, and then set out Korea‟s 
current strategy as well as its planned activities and evaluation process. Korea should be applauded for 
introducing the CASs which are a good effort to design an overall plan for a particular agency 
(KOICA or EDCF) in a partner country and are comprehensive and clear. However, KOICA and 
EDCF each produce a separate CAS for a given country, and therefore the next step is for the 
ministries to work together and produce a single, integrated CAS for countries in which they are both 
present. Furthermore, the master-plan Integrated Country Assistance Strategy for 2008-10 which 
outlines Korean aims in all the priority countries is at present a compilation of separate Korean 
interventions and would be more useful if it were a collectively designed strategic action plan. 
47. There is some inter-ministerial co-ordination through the Prime Minister led Committee for 
International Development Co-operation (comprising 15 ministers and 6 civil society representatives), 
but beyond this, as yet there is little attention given to Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). 
There is awareness of PCD by officials in MOFAT and KOICA, but Korea would benefit from more 
substantive efforts on taking account of the effect of other policies on economic growth in developing 
countries. As its aid grows, this is another issue that Korea will want to address. 
3.3 Ensuring the appropriate staff to manage an increasing aid budget 
48. As Korea increases its aid, it will need an appropriate number of staff with relevant 
development co-operation skills and experience. At present the total number of Korean ministry and 
agency staff working on development assistance is an estimated 335
12
 (Table 3).  Of these, 213 are 
employed by KOICA and the EDCF section of Eximbank consists of 65 staff.    
                                                     
12 Total staff number for MOFAT, MOSF, KOICA and EDCF – excluding other ministries.  
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49. Ensuring the appropriate number of staff does not imply that more staff is necessarily 
required. In fact, increased co-ordination and consolidation within the Korean system could lead to 
efficiencies and staff savings in some areas allowing for a redistribution of assets that could be put to 
better use in other areas. In the future, there will be a continued need to ensure staff are specifically 
equipped and trained in development co-operation skills. Furthermore, in some parts of the system, 
notably KOICA, measures are required to tackle high staff turnover, and to increase retention rates.  
50. Also on the horizon is the issue of decentralisation. Like many donors, and as part of its Paris 
Declaration commitments, Korea has taken some steps to move its operations closer to the realities of 
the field by decentralising. Currently, 20% of KOICA‟s staff are based in partner countries, whereas 
the figure for EDCF is only 7%.  
Table 3. Staff numbers 2007 
Ministry/Agency Numbers of staff 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs staff working on 
development co-operation (Seoul) 
  35 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance staff working 
on development co-operation (Seoul) 
                22 
KOICA total staff  
(KOICA headquarters staff) 
(KOICA field staff) 
213 
(171) 
(42) 
EDCF 65 
(EDCF headquarters staff) (60) 
(EDCF field staff) (5) 
Total  335 
 Source: Figures provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
3.4 Monitoring and evaluation  
51. The monitoring and evaluation of Korea‟s development co-operation activities are carried 
out by the implementing agencies (KOICA and Eximbank‟s EDCF), which have similar procedures.   
52. KOICA established an evaluation office in 1998, which reports directly to the President, and 
also produced project evaluation regulations in 2006. The project implementation teams themselves 
conduct the mid-term and project completion evaluations, whereas ex-post evaluations are carried out 
between six months to three years after project completion by the evaluation office. Similarly, project 
completion monitoring for EDCF loans is conducted by the project management units themselves, and 
ex-post evaluation is carried out two to three years after completion by an „evaluation unit‟. The 
evaluation unit is set-up specifically for this purpose and either consists of non-project related staff, or, 
for large projects, staff from beyond the EDCF group. Some evaluation reports are available to the 
public and published on the agencies‟ websites.  
53. In 2008 the government intends to establish a common set of evaluation guidelines to apply 
across all organisations/agencies. These guidelines need to help build a robust independent evaluation 
culture in line with international best practice. Furthermore, KOICA and EDCF should clearly 
articulate how evaluation results are used to shape future development co-operation activities.  
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3.5 Recommendations 
 With a less fragmented aid system, and more unified strategies, particularly at the country 
level, the coherence, efficiency and potential impact of Korean development activities could 
be increased. Country Assistance Strategies should be used as active management tools to 
develop integrated implementation plans for all Korean aid agencies operating in a country.   
 As Korea scales up its ODA it will want to professionalise its staff further and attract and 
retain quality staff. Greater co-ordination and consolidation could lead to efficiency gains – 
working „smarter‟ not „harder‟.  
 Korea would benefit from building a strong independent evaluation culture in line with 
international standards. This could include improving ongoing monitoring during project 
implementation, improving ex-post evaluation, and integrating lessons from evaluations into 
future programmes. Evaluations could consistently be made public in order to improve 
accountability.    
4. Aid effectiveness  
4.1 Committed to the aid effectiveness agenda 
54. Korea is committed to increasing the effectiveness of its aid, and has taken the positive step 
of signing the Paris Declaration and participating in the monitoring survey in 2006 – the only non-
DAC donor country to do so substantially. Although Korea‟s 2006 response to the survey only 
covered 3 countries representing 4% of its programmed aid, it demonstrates good intent, and Korea is 
extending monitoring to a more representative sample of 13 countries in the 2008 survey. 
4.2 Ownership and alignment  
55. Korea has begun engaging in more extensive dialogue with partner countries and discusses 
the Mid-Term Strategy and Country Assistance Strategies with partners. These interactions could be 
strengthened by aligning the CASs fully with partners development priorities, pursuing joint 
ownership, and fitting within partners‟ own country strategic plans. 
Table 4. Indicators on Aid Effectiveness for Korea 
Indicators  
(3-8 alignment,  
9-10 harmonisation) 
 
2005 
baseline 
ratio for 
Korea  
2005 global baseline  
(i.e. weighted average 
of all DAC donors) 
2010 Targets   
3 Aid flows are aligned on national 
priorities 
12%           88% 94% 
4 Strengthen capacity by co-
ordinated support 
  74% 
 
          48% 50% 
5a Use of country public financial 
management systems 
 45%           40% [80%] 
5b Use of country procurement  
systems 
0% 
 
          39% [80%] 
6 Avoid parallel implementation 
structures 
0             -- -- 
7 Aid is more predictable 12%           70% 87% 
8 Aid is untied --           75% Progress over time 
9 Use of common arrangement or  
procedures 
0%           43% 66% 
10a Joint mission 0%           18% 40% 
10b Joint country analytical work --           42% 66% 
Source:  OECD DAC Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration: overview of results May 2007. 
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56. Despite the monitoring survey‟s limited sample, it does give some indication of Korea‟s 
progress and challenges on aligning and harmonising its aid (Table 4). Indicator 3, which measures the 
extent to which aid flows are aligned to countries‟ national priorities is low at 12% compared to a 
DAC average of 88% and a target of 94%. But Korea scores well on co-ordinating its technical 
co-operation, 74% compared to a 48% average (indicator 4), and on the use of public financial 
management systems (indicator 5a). On the remaining alignment indicators, Korea has room for 
improvement, as it does not use country procurement systems (indicator 5b), has a low aid 
predictability score (indicator 7), and its aid is highly tied (section 4.3 below).   
4.3 A need to untie bilateral aid   
57. The tying status of aid has long been considered a key test of donors' commitment to 
coherent policies and effective aid delivery, and partner countries have consistently identified the 
practice of tying as one of the principal procedures that undermine aid effectiveness. It is clearly 
documented that tying aid raises the cost of many goods, services and works by 15% to 30% on 
average. These percentages represent a conservative estimate of the real costs of tied aid, since they do 
not incorporate the indirect costs of tying, which include often higher transaction costs for recipients. 
Furthermore, tied aid is often, at least, partially guided by commercial considerations, which do not 
necessarily match local needs and priorities. 
58. In line with these arguments, a large number of DAC Members have either fully untied their 
bilateral aid programmes, e.g. Australia, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom or almost completely untied, e.g. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, and 
Switzerland. As a consequence, the proportion of financial aid from DAC members recorded as untied 
has increased appreciably – from 42.5% in 2002 to 53.0% in 2006. 
59. An estimated 98% of Korean bilateral aid is either tied or partially tied (Table 5) – an 
extremely high proportion, and at odds with other DAC donors. The government is well aware that it 
needs to untie its bilateral aid to LDCs – partly in order to be considered for DAC membership. The 
previous government prepared a Roadmap to Untying which may be subject to change, but currently 
applies and foresees a gradual reduction in untying to meet the 2001 DAC Recommendation on 
Untying Official Development Assistance
13
 to the least developed countries by 2015.  
60. There is a need for debate, firstly across government, and secondly with the general public 
and the business sector, about the development benefits of untying aid, and the need to expose Korean 
companies to competition for aid funded procurement. The government should make the case that 
untying will be good for increasing the competitiveness of Korean firms in the longer term and will 
allow reciprocal access to much larger markets (e.g. EU reciprocity on untied aid). 
Table 5. Tying status of bilateral ODA commitments 2004-06 (USD) 
 2004 2005 2006 
Total bilateral commitments
1
 
 
of which:  untied  
 partially untied 
 tied 
410 
 
17 
62 
331 
555 
 
14 
89 
452 
525 
 
10 
98 
417 
  1. Excludes technical co-operation and administrative costs. 
                                                     
13 Excludes free-standing technical co-operation and food aid.  
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61. Korea should progressively increase the proportion of its untied aid in its future development 
assistance with the aim of meeting the DAC requirement within a reasonable timeframe of becoming a 
DAC member. Korea should not under-estimate the importance that the DAC gives to abiding by the 
recommendation – a necessary condition for DAC membership.14 
4.4 Harmonisation  
62. Korea recognises that at present it does not co-ordinate nor co-operate extensively with other 
donors. This is reflected in the monitoring survey which shows that Korea does not use common 
arrangement or procedures (indicator 9), undertake joint missions (indicator 10a), or conduct joint 
country analytical work (indicator 10b). The government has stated that in the future it will „actively 
participate in donor co-ordination meetings and undertake joint projects’ 15 and has begun bilateral 
policy dialogues with other donors such as Japan and the United Kingdom.    
4.5 Recommendations 
 Korea should be commended for signing the Paris Declaration and for taking part in the 
monitoring survey. Korea is advised to continue to make progress on aligning its aid with 
partner countries‟ national systems. It is also encouraged to co-ordinate and harmonise with 
other donors, including through the use of joint projects and delegated co-operation, 
especially with donors in areas where Korea does not have experience or presence.  
 Korea is aware that it needs to untie its aid further. The „Roadmap on Untying‟ is a positive 
start, but significant progress is required, and the government should be mindful that it must 
fully comply with the DAC recommendation on untying within a reasonable timeframe after 
it joins the DAC. 
5. Humanitarian action  
5.1 Humanitarian policy and practice 
63. Korea is not a signatory to the Principles and Good Practices of Humanitarian Donorship 
(the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative), which are the usual basis for assessing humanitarian 
components of aid programs within the DAC peer review process. Nevertheless, this assessment uses 
the GHD principles and good practices as de facto benchmarks for the Korean humanitarian action 
program.  
64. Currently, Korea does not have a humanitarian action policy, but intends to address this 
deficit. The forthcoming policy is expected to include a commitment to the humanitarian aid principles 
of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. It also represents an ideal opportunity for 
Korea to formally endorse and embrace the GHD principles and practices. The policy should also 
outline how Korea will link humanitarian objectives (including prevention, preparedness and recovery) 
with broader development objectives. 
                                                     
14 Furthermore, Korea is a Participant to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits. The 
DAC Secretariat has consulted with the Export Credit Division of the OECD‟s Trade and Agriculture 
Directorate, which has advised that Korea notifies relevant tied aid offers in accordance with Chapter 
4 of the Arrangement, and participates in any resulting consultations.  The Export Credit Division is 
not aware of any issue in regard to Korea‟s participation in the arrangement that would impede its 
application to the DAC.  
15 Korea memorandum to the DAC special review. Page 38. 
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65. In recent years, Korea has expanded humanitarian aid efforts. Expenditure has grown from 
1% of gross bilateral ODA (USD 4 million) in 2003, to 5% of gross bilateral ODA (USD 23 million) 
in 2006 – slightly below the DAC average of 6%. There has also been organisational reform, with a 
Humanitarian Aid Division created within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2007, an 
overhaul of the rapid response machinery and an Overseas Emergency Relief Act enacted in 2007. The 
Act underpins the government‟s ability to provide emergency assistance and to promote greater 
co-operation with the international community in disaster relief. Furthermore, a recently published 
emergency relief manual provides operational guidance.  
66. Korea‟s main bilateral interventions have been in large-scale natural disasters in Asia, to 
which it has responded by sending goods and funds as well as professional relief workers and 
volunteers. Major humanitarian interventions include responding to the Bam earthquake in 2003, the 
South Asian Tsunami in 2004, the Pakistan earthquake in 2005, the landslides in the Philippines and 
the Yogyakarta earthquake in 2006. At present, there is limited evidence of how Korea evaluates these 
interventions, and how findings are being used to inform future interventions. It has also begun to 
work through multilateral channels, funding the humanitarian UN agencies directly, and should be 
commended for contributing to UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals, and the Central Emergency 
Response Fund (CERF). Funding to the CERF was USD 5 million in 2006, USD 1.5 million in 2007 
and USD 2 million has been pledged for 2008. As Korean ODA grows, Korea could also consider how 
it could play a stronger role in increasing its support to multilateral humanitarian assistance efforts, in 
order to extend its reach to areas of the world beyond Asia.  
67. MOFAT and KOICA are discussing with the Ministry of Defence how to make appropriate 
use of military assets in humanitarian crises. This dialogue should ensure that deployment of Korean 
military assets conforms to international guidelines specified under the GHD Initiative, including the 
1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 
Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian 
Activities in Complex Emergencies.
16
       
5.2 Recommendations 
 The new policy on humanitarian aid should contain an explicit commitment to the Good 
Humanitarian Donorship principles and good practices, including the core principles of 
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.  
 Korea is commended for increasing humanitarian aid spending; as it scales up, and in line 
with the provisions of the Overseas Emergency Relief Act, it should ensure that its 
humanitarian activities are needs-based, not driven by visibility objectives, and are delivered 
within the framework of a coordinated international response. It should look to the 
experience of other donors who often predominantly use multilateral and pooled funding 
channels, rather than develop parallel bilateral delivery systems. 
                                                     
16 Both are known as the „Oslo Guidelines‟. 
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ANNEX A 
 
ORGANISATION CHARTS 
Figure A.1. Organisation Chart - KOICA 
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Figure A.1. Co-operation System of EDCF 
• Deliberation or principal policies concerning operation 
and  management
• Deliberation on EDCF operational programs and 
review of financial statements
• Determination of assistance policy for important 
projects
• Other matters deemed necessary
• Drafting EDCF operational 
programs and financial 
statements
• Preparing principal policies
concerning operation and 
management
• Selection of projects under 
considering for assistance
• Determination of assistance 
policy
• Proposal presentation to the 
Fund Management Council
• Acceptance of loan requests
• Notification of assistance 
policies
• Execution of inter-governmental 
agreements
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• EDCF operation and management
• Dispatch of appraisal mission
• Preparing appraisal reports
• Loan negotiations
• Execution of loan agreements
• Loan disbursements
• Collection of repayment of principal 
and interest thereon
• Project supervision
• Ex-post evaluation
• Other advisory services
Note:
a) Members of the Fund Management
Council: The Minister of Finance and
Economy (Chairman); the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Minister
of Science and Technology; the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry; the Minster
of Commerce, Industry and Energy; the
Minster of Information and
Communications; the Minister of Health
and Welfare; the Minster of
Construction and Transportation; the
Minister of Maritime Affairs and
Fisheries; the Minister of Planning and
Budget; the Chief Economic Secretary
of the Presidential Secretariat; the
Deputy Director of the National
Intelligence Service; the Minister of the
Office for Government Policy
Coordination; the Chairman and
President of the Export-Import Bank of
Korea; and the President of the Korea
International Cooperation Agency.
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Other Relevant Ministries
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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